In conjunction with Maudsley Learning, the Mental Health and Justice Project is running a one-day Maudsley Masterclass on ‘Approaching Complex Capacity Assessments’ on Tuesday 18th June and again on Wednesday 3rd July at the Ortus Centre, Denmark Hill, London. The Masterclass is directed at any clinician who frequently encounters issues around decision-making capacity whilst caring for their patients, and so should be particularly interesting and useful to psychiatrists. Teachers
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Approaching Complex Capacity Assessments – Maudsley Masterclass
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Taking capacity seriously? Ten years of mental capacity disputes before England’s Court of Protection
Abstract Most of the late 20th century wave of reforms in mental capacity or competence law were predicated upon the so-called ‘functional’ model of mental capacity, asking not merely whether a person had a mental disorder or disability but rather whether they were capable of making a specific decision (or decisions) at a specific point of time. This model is now
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Video – Annual Sowerby Lecture in Philosophy and Medicine 2017
Mental Health and Justice: Classical and Romantic Perspectives Lecture: Dr. Gareth Owen, King’s College London, Institute of Psychiatry, Philosophy and Neuroscience 9 November 2017 New Hunt’s House, Theatre 2, Guy’s Campus With thanks to Philosophy & Medicine
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Paradigm shifts or mirages?
The Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on the compliance of United Kingdom with the CRPD makes a very substantial number of hard-hitting, difficult to read (or refute) observations and recommendations about the ways in which the United Kingdom is letting down the rights of the disabled. Link to
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Hard Capacity Cases – An English Perspective and a Plea for Help
Alex Ruck Keene 7th August 2017
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Advances in Mental Health and Intellectual Disabilities
Is mental capacity in the eye of the beholder? The law, at least in England and Wales, divides adults [1] into those who have the mental capacity to make decisions and those who do not. This distinction is crucial, and underpins health and social care practice, not least as it answers the questions: (1) can
